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THE USES OF ARISTOTLE IN GADAMER'S RECOVERY OF




In what follows, Gadamer's appropriation of bouleuesthai
(deliberation or taking counsel with oneself) from Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics will be used to retrieve an even earlier,
communal understanding of reasoning, which is evident in Homer but
which has been increasingly covered over in argumentation theory
beginning with Plato.' Significantly for us in the English speaking
world, this concealment and distortion continues through Hobbes and
Locke and, into present times, with Maclntyre, Toulmin, and analytic
philosophy generally. For in the Western and, more specifically,
Anglo-American tradition of reasoning, what was in the beginning
consultation taken with others, what was originally sumbouleuesthai
based on hearing what others have to say as we take counsel with
them in councils (boulai), has changed into each individual's attempt
to show, or even impose upon, others what he or she has seen for him
or herself. Sumbouleuesthai has become apodeixis; consultation has
become demonstration.
What is more, in the hands of English speaking thinkers, this
conversion of consultative reasoning into demonstration has led to
the devolution of reasoning into the argumentative form of what C.B.
MacPherson has aptly called "possessive individualism. ' 2  The
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Lowell. In 1966, Professor Smith
completed his Ph.D. at Heidelberg University after five years of study under Hans-Georg
Gadamer, who mentored Professor Smith for his dissertation, Das Sein des Du: Buber's
Philosophie im Lichte des Heidegger'schen Denkens an das Sein. Professor Smith's books
include three extensively commented translations of Gadamer's works and his own
Hermeneutics and Human Finitude (1991) and The Hermeneutics of Original Argument (1998).
1. Gadamer's word for bouleuesthai is Mitsichzurategehen. See HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, WAHRHE1T UND METHODE 304 (Tuibingen 1965). Translations from the German
and Greek are my own except where otherwise noted.
2. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962); see also P. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF
ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC, RHETORIC 5-6, 312 n.4 (1998).
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individual reasoner, as Toulmin puts it, now states-or should we say,
"stakes"-a "claim" and then defends it against other individuals,
who in seeking to secure their own "turf," would call it into question.
3
For once the original community of reasoning is suppressed, as occurs
with the Anglo-American hypostasis of the private individual or
"self," "communication" becomes at best the self-interested, com-
munity-less exchange of one "person's" information or intellectual
property for another's and at worst the sophistical attempt to
vanquish and dominate the other in verbal conflict.4 Consultative
reasoning now degenerates into "argument" in the current sense of
litigious, adversarial contention. No wonder, then, that MacIntyre
speaks of "interminable" debate between "rival" points of view.
5
First, we will investigate Plato's abstraction from Homer's
oral/aural, dialogical understanding of reasoning, and the turn to
reasoning as monological demonstration of an individual's insight.
6
Second, we will trace, albeit succinctly, the perpetuation and
intensification of this abstraction and turn in the English-language
understanding of argument provided by Hobbes and Locke. Third,
and in conclusion, we will turn to Aristotle and the uses Gadamer
makes of him, as well as of the dialogical Plato, in recovering the
3. For Toulmin's original reformulation of the pattern of argument along the lines of
forensic or judicial reasoning, see STEPHEN EDELSTON TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT
(1958). For our purposes, however, the text-book version of this reformulation, see STEPHEN
TOULMIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING (1984), will prove more indicative of the
devolution of communal reasoning to self-interested "transactions" between private individuals.
See, e.g., id. at 9-11 ("Reasoning as a Critical Transaction").
4. Personae et res are, we note, empty legal abstractions from what people are and from
what people possess originally in the web of their particular roles and relationships in their
community-as parents, children, neighbors, "doctors, lawyers, merchants, chiefs," etc. See P.
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, HERMENEUTICS AND HUMAN FINITUDE: TOWARD A THEORY OF
ETHICAL UNDERSTANDING 30-38 (1991) (discussing Hegel and the displacement of the original
"ethical community" (sittliche Gemeinschaft) by the "condition of right" (Rechtszustand) and its
correlate, the commercial "system of need satisfaction" (System der Bediirfnisbefriedigung)).
5. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 6 (1981).
6. Actually, there are two contradictory strands in Plato, the Pythagorean mathematical
and the dialogical. The tension between them reflects the similar tension in Pythagoreanism
between the mathemata (mathematical) teachings transmitted in writing and the akousmata
(auditory) ethical doctrines transmitted only in speech. As Plato's Phaedo underscores,
Socrates's Pythagorean auditors, Cebes and Simmias, who are familiar with only the mathemata
of their Pythagorean teacher, Philolaus, are at a loss when confronted with ethical, existential
questions of how one should live one's life toward death. In regard to suicide, Cebes submits,
"About these matters I have never heard (ak~koa) anything clear from anyone." To which
Socrates responds, "You have only to take heart. For perhaps then you too will hear
(akousais)." PLATO, PHAEDO 61d-e. Clearly, the early and middle dialogues remain suspended
somewhere between the old orality and the new literacy and mathematics. For Gadamer's
response to this tension, see P. Christopher Smith, Plato As Impulse and Obstacle in Gadamer's




original Homeric idea of reasoning as consultation. Here we will
consider the challenge Gadamer's appropriation of Aristotle poses
for our own, Anglo-American adversarial, "legal" paradigm for
reasoning.7
I. PLATO'S ABSTRACTION FROM THE ORIGINAL COMMUNITY OF
SPEAKERS
For a better understanding of Plato's transformation of the
original understanding of reasoning in Homer, let us turn to a decisive
passage in the Philebus. In one excursus, Plato's "Socrates" draws an
analogy of true and false pleasure with true and false judgment
(doxa). For in order to establish that "true" and "false" can be
predicated of pleasure too-which is the prima facie point of the
excursus-this "Socrates" must first clarify these words' usual
application to judgment.9 The exposition seems to proceed naturally
enough from a question one asks oneself ("What is that thing next to
the rock which appears to be standing there under a tree?"), ° to an
answer one gives oneself ("It is a human being"), and, lastly, to an
assertion (logos) "voiced aloud to someone else present."'" It is
significant, however, that this later dialogue, the Philebus, then
abandons this oral-acoustical model altogether and turns to the
interior experience of reading writing, which is to say, the "marks"
made by memory. As Socrates now puts it:
In coinciding with perceptions and sensations experienced in
connection with them, it seems to me almost as if memory at times
writes assertions in our minds (en tais pschuais), and when this
experience writes the truth, then the judgment is true and true
assertions come from it and develop in us.
12
In retrospect, we see that this turn away from communicative,
acoustical orality to privately read, interiorized writing was, in fact,
foreshadowed by the very starting point for the account of doxa,
7. Toulmin's recasting of demonstrative argument on the legal or judicial model is surely a
breakthrough and not to be diminished. At the same time, however, his recurrence to this
model thwarts any advance beyond the argumentative form of "possessive individualism." See
infra Part III; see also SMITH, supra note 2, at 311 n.3; P. Christopher Smith, Toward a
Discursive Logic: Gadamer and Toulmin on Inquiry and Argument, in THE SPEcTER OF
RELATIVISM: TRUTH, DIALOGUE, AND PHRONESIS IN PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 159-77
(Lawrence K. Schmidt ed., 1995).
8. See PLATO, PHILEBUS 36e-39a.
9. See id. at 38c-e.
10. See id. at 38d.
11. Id. at 38e.
12. Id. at 39a.
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which is to say, not hearing and learning the word for something from
another speaker in one's community, but the individual soul's own
dialogos with itself aneu phones (without voice). 13 Importantly, this
starting point coincides with the shift in Plato's dramatic writings to
the new dialectic and dialegesthai, no longer as "talking things
through" orally in audible questions and answers, but now as "sorting
things out" visually by gene and eide (classes and forms of things).
Indeed, the original communal experience of hearing word names
(onomata) for things from others, and thus learning what they are, is
now translated entirely into privately viewing perceptions and then,
again privately, reading the stationary memorial marks and signs en
tais psuchais (in our minds and by ourselves). In the original
experience of hearing the word, we came to know what something is
by hearing and learning the name for it from someone else in our
language community. But here it is said, on the contrary, that we first
see the form (eidos) of what something is by ourselves, and then we
attach a conventional word sign to it in the event that we
subsequently and only secondarily might want to communicate our
insight.
14
Now quite in contrast to Plato, Homer, whether he does write or
not, still speaks out of the preliterate, oral, acoustical tradition.
Moreover, he gives us striking evidence for the original coincidence
of getting to know what or who something or someone is by first
hearing the name from someone else, and only then, as is the case in
the examples we will take here, hearing it again in one's mind. Thus
Homer gives us evidence for the abstraction in any account that
reduces the name of something to a memorial sign for a prior mental
vision; a sign used only secondarily to record and communicate an
insight one first has by oneself.
If we turn to Book XIX of the Odyssey," we see that Odysseus's
former nurse, the now aged Euracleia, knows who this ragged
creature, whose feet she is washing, really is only when, having felt
the telltale scar remaining on his leg from a boar's attack in his youth,
she recalls his name: "But you are Odysseus (e mal' Odusseus essi),
dear child! I did not yet know you before (oude s' eg6 ge prin egn6n),
not until I had touched you all around, my lord."'16 It is not some
13. See PLATO, SOPHIST 263e.
14. See id.
15. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. XIX, 386-475.
16. Id. at 474-75.
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visual mental record that she correlates with a perception here-after
all, this man does not look like Odysseus at all-but, conversely, a
perception, more tactile than visual, that evokes audibly in her mind
the name she has heard and learned long ago from others, and which
alone allows her now to name and know the real being of the one she
has before her, "Odysseus," "dear child," "lord." Only hearing the
name, first from others and now in her mind, lets her know who this
is; hearing the name first brings Odysseus into being for her.
Thus, seeing something for oneself is precisely not equivalent to
knowing here. Euracleia does not first see and know who is before
her and then proceed to designate this vision with some conventional
word sign in order that she might remember her insight and then
communicate it to someone else. On the contrary, until she once
again hears in her mind the name triggered by the scar, what she sees
before her and envisions is still only a "beggar." Similarly, in the
grand recognition scene of Book XXIII, Penelope knows for sure
who-and what-this stranger is only when she can name him
"Odysseus.""a "Be not angry with me, Odysseus," she says, having
learned from the "sign" of his knowledge of their immovable, tree-
trunk bed that this is indeed "Odysseus" and calling him by name for
the first time.
18
We note the original sense of s~meion, here as semata in "semat'
anagnousei" (she recognized the sign(s)).19 Significantly, the word
name (onoma), in this case "Odysseus," is not at all a sign signifying
some preexistent entity she had already envisioned in her own mind.
Instead, the sign indicates to her, or better, evokes in her, the audible
onoma that alone will call something into being for her as who, or
what, it is in the first place. As was Odysseus's scar for Euracleia,
here Odysseus's knowledge of the bridal bed is the sign for Penelope
that brings the audible word name to mind again. Only this name
from time out of mind and heard long ago from others lets her know
the being of the one she has before her, lets her know who he really
is.20
17. See id. bk. XXIII, 173-209.
18. Id. at 209.
19. See id. at 206.
20. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 72-78 (discussing the significance of the trope prosopoeia or
"naming" things as one "names" people). Another source for this line of thought is Heidegger's
appropriation of Stephan George's verse, "Kein ding sei wo das wort Gebricht" (There be no




With these instances of the audible name coming to mind,
Homer makes clear just why indeed there is no such thing as a private
language: he shows us that the names we have for things and people
are heard and learned from others in a language community that was
always already there before the individual members born to that
community began to think for themselves using these word names. In
other words, language, audible speech, is not invented by private
individuals to signify thoughts they already have but is the gift of the
community that allows the individual to think in the first place. Not
cogito ergo sum is the truth of the matter, rather loquimur ergo
cogito.
21
The fact that private thought, as Homer shows, originates in first
hearing in a common, public language points up the political
abstraction in Plato's reconstruction of bouleuesthai, or taking
counsel with oneself, as the "voiceless dialogue of the soul with
itself. '22 We note, for example, that Achilles, who from the Platonic
perspective would seem to think and act by himself, is in fact defined
in the Iliad by his self-imposed exile from the boulai (councils of his
kinfolk), the Achaeans. Indeed, we find Homer saying in Book I,
"And not ever did he frequent the meeting place (agora) where
honor is won. '23 For his rage at having been dishonored at the hands
of Agamemnon, this m~nis, which is the theme of the Iliad, only now
keeps him away. His isolation, this is to say, is to be understood as
the deprivation of his original community, and any such private
deliberations as he or anyone else might engage in on their own are
but interiorized consultations, the performance of which one first
learns in taking counsel with others and listening to what they have to
say.
We remark that the centerpiece of Book I, which precedes
Achilles' withdrawal, is his and Agamemnon's participation in the
open debate, in the council of the Achaeans, concerning what should
be done to assuage the wrath of Apollo. Moreover, the embassy of
Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax sent to Achilles in Book IX clearly has
as its task not to create a community of heretofore separate
21. Not "I think, therefore I am," but "We speak, therefore I think." We will not consider
French Cartesianism here, rather the English-speaking tradition. However, the criticisms of the
latter developed in this study can be applied equally to the former even if Descartes takes the
subject's private cogitations as his starting point and Hobbes, Locke, et al., take the subject's
private sense perceptions as theirs.
22. PLATO, supra note 13, at 263e.
23. HOMER, THE ILIAD bk. I, 490-492.
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individuals-such as is projected in the contract theory of a Locke or
Rawls-but to restore Achilles to the preexistent community and
councils of the Achaeans. The very fact that the embassy fails in this
task makes obvious what the task was. Here, for instance, is
Achilles's response to Odysseus's overtures: "Let him [Agamemnon]
not fool with me anymore; he will not convince me. Rather, let him,
Odysseus, contrive with you (sun soi ... phrazesth6) and the other
kings how to fend off the ravaging fire from the ships";24 "I will
contrive together with him (oi. .. sumphrassomai) neither any
counsel nor action (oude ti boulas, oude men ergon).
' 25
Mark Edwards points out that there are eleven soliloquies in the
Iliad and that all of them are "introduced by a normal verb of
speaking, indicating that they are thought of as uttered aloud rather
than as simply the unspoken thoughts of the character. ' 26 This, of
course, is completely natural for an oral, preliterate culture where, in
sharp contrast to the account of forming a judgment in Plato's
Philebus, writing as yet plays no role, and where any deliberation
about something such as reading writing in the soul without voice,
aneu ph6nes, would be inconceivable. Here words, as well as one's
own thoughts couched in them, are always heard from, and spoken to,
others in one's community; words are never seen, read, or envisioned
by oneself.
As evidence for this, let us consider Hector's deliberations over
whether to stand and face the onslaught of Achilles.27 For even if
Hector's decision to stand his ground is famously overthrown when
he eventually cuts and runs, his deliberations display, by sheer
contrast, the patent abstraction in Plato's understanding of
deliberation as the soul's reading by itself its own writing within itself.
They display Plato's abstraction, this is to say, from the origins of
bouleuesthai in sumbouleuesthai, of taking counsel with oneself in first
taking counsel with others.
To begin with, we note that Hector's deliberations do not
originate, as in the Philebus, in the social vacuum of the isolated
soul's private and silent dialogue with itself. On the contrary, they
are expressly preceded by counsel that Hector hears first from next of
kin, from his father, then from his mother. "Wailing, lamenting
24. Id. at 345-47.
25. Id. at 374.
26. MARK EDWARDS, HOMER, POET OF THE ILIAD 94 (1987).
27. See HOMER, supra note 23, bk. XXII, 99-130.
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greatly," Priam "shouted" to him,28 "Hector, do not just stay, awaiting
this man, dear child, alone and apart from the others. '2 9 And then
Hecuba "streaming tears, spoke to him winged words":30 "For if he
kills you I can no longer mourn you on the death-bed, sweet branch, o
child of my bearing, nor can your generous wife mourn you, but a big
way from us beside the ships of the Argives the running dogs will feed
on you."31 "Thus," Homer concludes, "the two, crying and lamenting
greatly, spoke to their dear son ... but Hector's heart was not
convinced. '32
Here it is plain that the prerequisite and indispensable rhetorical
context for Hector's own taking counsel with himself, for his own
bouleuesthai, is sumbouleuesthai, namely his taking counsel with
philoi, with kin dear to him in his community. 33 And thus Hector's
own deliberations are introduced, as is typical for Homer, with
Hector speaking aloud to himself as if he were both speaker and
listener, each still engaged in taking counsel with someone else:
"Anguished," the story says, "he now spoke to himself in his great
heart. '' 34 We note too that his deliberations are in no way optical,
rather they are entirely acoustical.35 Not voiceless viewing things, not
silently reading written marks and signs "in the mind itself by itself"
are the model, but listening to the voiced word that one first hears
from another.
36
II. THE ENGLISH PERPETUATION OF PLATO'S ABSTRACTION
Despite an interlude of two millennia, the account Hobbes gives
in Philosophical Rudiments (de Cive) of "the internal ratiocination of
the mind without words"37 remains remarkably like the account of
28. Id. at 33-37.
29. Id. at 38-39.
30. Id. at 81.
31. Id. at 86-89 (Richmond Lattimore's translation).
32. Id. at 91.
33. A typical example of the priority of sumbouleuesthai over bouleuesthai is provided by
Aeschylus, when Electra calls upon the chorus for advice: "You servant women, who maintain
the order of the house... be my counselors (sumbouloi) in these matters." AESCHYLUS,
LIBATION BEARERS 83-86. "Be sharers, o, dear ones (philai), in this counsel (boule)." Id. at
100; see also SMITH, supra note 4, at 29-31, 154-56 (discussing philia as the precondition of
community).
34. HOMER, supra note 23, bk. XXII, 93.
35. See id. at 99-131.
36. See PLATO, supra note 6, at 68a, 79d, for the visions of the "mind itself by itself' (aute
kath' hauten he psychO).
37. THOMAS HOBBES, PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS (DE CIVE) bk. I, ch I, § 3.
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forming a judgment (doxa) given in the Philebus and Sophist, and
hence it perpetuates and amplifies the very same Platonic
abstractions from our original community with others. For in Hobbes
too the exposition begins with the thinking of the private individual
prior to hearing names for things from someone else: "If therefore,"
he writes, "a man see something afar off and obscurely, although no
appellation had yet been given to anything, he will, notwithstanding,
have the same idea of that thing for which now, by imposing a name
on it, we call it body." Coming nearer, "he will have a new idea
thereof, namely that for which we now call such a thing animated"
and, coming nearer still, "he perceives the figure, hears the voice,...
[and] he has a third idea, though it have yet no appellation, namely
that for which we now call anything rational.
38
Even for such abstract names, this is to say, as "body,"
"animated," and "rational," which are only subsequently com-
pounded in the idea named "man," my distinct idea comes to me first,
prior to hearing from someone else the words we use to name these
ideas. Only afterwards do I invoke the "appellation" or names we
have subsequently convened upon to exchange our individual ideas
with each other.39 For I recognize what something is quite apart from
knowing the name we have for it. Hence the community's names for
things do not, as in Homer, first bring these things into being and
presence for me. Rather, in Hobbes these names are mere "marks"-
Plato would say "writing" (graphe)-that the individual makes for
himself primarily to record his reasoning for himself and then, only
secondarily, to make his thoughts known to someone else.40  "A
name," says Hobbes:
is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark, which may raise in
our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which
being pronounced to other, may be to them a sign of what thought
the speaker had, or not before in his mind.
41
Far from evoking the name, as in Homer, here the sign is a name and
the name, a sign; a sign, that is, which de-sign-ates an idea in the
mind. Precisely as in the Philebus, then, speech is thought to begin
with what individuals see for themselves, not with what they hear
from others in their community: "Words so and so connected,"
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Just how we would convene upon names for things without previously having any
names seems mysterious to say the least. For how, lacking any names, would we communicate
our proposals to each other in order that we might convene upon them?




Hobbes tells us, "signify the cogitations and motions of our mind. '42
Here the "sign" does not, as in Homer, bring to mind the audible,
communal word name that first endows something with its being for
me; rather, as in Plato, the "sign" signifies the idea that I already have
privately in my isolated mind, "itself by itself."
In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke follows
Hobbes closely in proposing that words have two uses, "First, one for
the recording of our own thoughts," and "Secondly, the other for the
communicating of our thoughts to others. '43 In regard to the first, he
maintains, again in full agreement with Hobbes, that "since sounds
are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what
words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself."" "As to
communication by words," Locke continues, "that too has a double
use," namely "civil" and "philosophical."45 Locke explains the civil
use of words as "communication of thoughts and ideas by words, as
may serve for the upholding common conversation and commerce,
about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life. '46 The
philosophical use, he tells us, is such "as may serve to convey the
precise notions of things. ' 47 Our concern is with the first, but Locke
sees the same problem in both the philosophical and civil uses, even if
in the civil use, as he says, "a great deal less exactness will serve. '48
For, "[w]ords having naturally no signification, the idea which each
stands for must be learned and retained, by those who would
exchange thoughts,' 49 but this does not always happen, and happens
least of all with "moral words."
Let us postpone for a moment consideration of the commer-
cialization of discourse that, with the ideas of "commerce" and
"exchange," has insinuated itself into Locke's thinking here and
establish, first, how he, like Plato and Hobbes before him, has
reversed the actual sequence in knowing for oneself what something
is and hearing and having a name for it. It is clear that in Locke's, just
as in these other thinkers' misunderstanding of reasoning, private
individuals are assumed to think for themselves without having first
42. Id. § 3.
43. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. III, ch. IX, § 1.
44. Id. § 2.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 3.
47. Id.
4& Id.
49. Id. § 5.
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heard the words for things from others, and only then do they import
audible words into their thinking in order, first, to record the wordless
thoughts they have already had and, second, if need be, to
"communicate" these to someone else. But in fact we never think in
wordless ideas, but only in the words we have first heard from others
and then hear again in our thinking.
The failure to see this involves Locke in grave difficulties,
particularly in regard to "moral words," for which, Locke says:
[T]he sounds are usually learned first; and then, to know what
complex ideas they stand for, they [individuals] are either beholden
to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part)
left to their own observation and industry; which being little laid
out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names, the
moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare
sounds.50
It is remarkable that here, for once, Locke acknowledges the actual
priority of hearing the words from others in the community and
thereby depending on others for an understanding of their use and
meaning. He does so, however, assuming that this sequence of first
hearing the words and then understanding what they mean is the
wrong, reversed one, and that it leads only to confusion error because
the words have no individual's thoughts to refer to in the first place.
That Locke is mistaken in this assumption can be illustrated
easily with a glance at the history of the "moral word" justice. In
Isaiah 5:7, for instance, we find, at the end of the "Song of the
Vineyard," two words that contribute decisively to the manifold
traditions of "justice": "He looked for mishpat, but behold,
bloodshed, for sedaqah, but behold, a cry." In the Septuagint this
becomes "I waited for it [Israel] to produce krisis, but it produced
lawlessness, and not dikaiosune but a cry"; in the Vulgate, "I expected
it to produce iudicium, and, see, iniquity, and justitia, and see, a cry";
and in the King James Version, "He looked for judgment, but behold
oppression, for righteousness, but behold a cry"; which in the Revised
Standard Version has become, "He expected justice, but saw
bloodshed; righteousness, but heard a cry." Now clearly, and contrary
to Locke's account, there is no single, fixed, and self-identical truth
here, no prelingual idea of justice that could ever have been
envisioned by some solitary individual ahead of time, and for which
all these words would be merely marks and signs. In fact, what we
have here is what Aristotle calls endoxa, or the received opinions that
50. Id.
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these words call into being each time they are translated and spoken
in a new linguistic context-Greek, Latin, English-and which
thereby continue, inexhaustibly, to acquire ever new senses, or what
Gadamer calls "an accretion in being" (Zuwachs an Sein).51
It thus turns out that "moral words' lack of a "true and precise
meaning," which Locke both fears and bemoans, is their strength and
not their weakness. Nor does their indeterminacy and imprecision
imply a dismissal of "truth" altogether. For example, our consul-
tations with each other about "justice" are about what is truly just,
save that "truth" here is not the truth of some statically present idea
but the ever changing truth "received" from others and unfolding
anew each time in the words we hear and say about it. Accordingly,
we discern this truth, not in solitary cogitations, but only from within
the continuing tradition of our consultations concerning it. Contrary
to Locke, I do not first get to see the truth in some "dialogue of the
mind with itself"; rather, I first get to hear the truth in the words
someone else says to me, or better, we first come to hear it together in
consultation with each other.
Locke makes exactly the same mistake in his politics, for there
too he assumes that our "original position," as a latter day Lockean
calls it, is not that of a participant in a community but of a solitary,
free individual mixing his labor with the things of the earth and
thereby making them his property, and who, only subsequently,
proceeds to enter into social and political relationships, namely
contracts governing the exchange of what is his property and labor for
what is someone else's.52
This account is, of course, as phenomenologically inaccurate as
was Locke's account of language, and, we note, for precisely the same
reasons. For no more are we originally thinkers without a common
language than are we originally private persons without a community
that raises us and endows us with the language and material goods
that then allow us, secondarily, to think on our own and to
appropriate private property for ourselves. In my family of origin, for
example, neither my parents nor I "owned" the dining room furniture
privately any more than we each had our own language; like our
language, the furniture was ours to be used in common practices, in
this case, eating meals, celebrating holidays, and the like. The
51. GADAMER, supra note 1, at 133.
52. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT chs. II, V, VII, & VIII.
For "original position," see JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971).
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furniture was neither their property nor mine. Of course when a
family is dissolved by death or divorce, for instance, it must be
determined by law which legal "parties" or "persons" are to become
the "rightful" owners of it. But to speak with Hegel, that happens
only when, and for as long as, the original "sittliche Gemeinschaft,"
the "ethical community" of parents and children, has been displaced
by the derivative and abstract "Rechtszustand," or the legal
"condition of right.""3 Thus, just as in his account of language, in his
account of political association too, Locke gets the communal and
individual in the wrong order.
Most important for us, a correlation of his political theory with
his language theory reveals disastrous implications for political and
even judicial discourse insofar as the later forfeits its consultative
dimension and becomes the adversarial contention of contestants.
For the idea of consultative reasoning is inevitably corrupted once the
basic idea of public discourse is subsumed under the idea of
transactional exchanges of private property in accord with legal
contracts.5 4 As Gadamer observes, one can only take counsel with
philoi, with those, this is to say, with whom one feels kinship, and
never with self-interested competitors.55 For we must be confident of
the counselor's concern for our own well being rather than his or her
own.1
6
III. ARISTOTLE, GADAMER, AND CONSULTATIVE REASONING
Even within his own exposition of demonstrative reasoning in
Posterior Analytics, we find an important indication that Aristotle
does not fully adhere to the later Plato's projected transformation of
all reasoning from the dialegesthai of "talking things through" with
others to monological demonstration or the dialegesthai of "sorting
things out" by genus and species. Aristotle draws, if only in passing, a
53. See supra note 4.
54. Commercial metaphors for public reasoning seem to be a special preference of the
English, resulting, no doubt, from the increasing influence of a mercantile class in England. In
Francis Bacon's "idols of the marketplace," for instance, the way is paved-via Adam Smith-
to Mill's "marketplace of ideas." Plato, at least, saw clearly the havoc commercialization would
wreak on any dialogical discourse. See P. Christopher Smith, Not Doctrine but 'Placing in
Question': The "Thrasymachus" (Rep. 1) As an Er6t~sis of Commercialization, in WHO SPEAKS
FOR PLATO? STUDIES IN PLATONIC ANONYMITY 113 (Gerald A. Press ed., 2000).
55. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 306.
56. The same point is emphasized in Aristotle by the role in conviction or peithein he
assigns to eunoia or the good intentions of the speaker, and the communication of philia or
kinship. See ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC 11.1.
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remarkable distinction: "For demonstration," he tells us, "is not a
matter for outward reasoning, since neither is the [demonstrative]
syllogism, but rather for reasoning within the mind (en tei psychei).
Indeed, objections can always be stated to outward reasoning (ho ex6
logos) but not always to internal reasoning (ho es6 logos)."7 There
are, this is to say, two kinds of reasoning, the one, internal reasoning
(ho es6 logos) within the mind (en tei psychii), and the other outward
reasoning (ho ex6 logos). Internal reasoning, we may infer, is
monological and silent. It begins and ends with the self unless one
wishes to "demonstrate" or "show" its results to others, in which case
they, in turn, may raise objections. But external reasoning is
dialogical and audible and begins and ends in voiced communication
with others, who from the start can object to what a speaker is saying.
Granted, it never occurs to Aristotle to say, as we are saying here,
that demonstration "within the mind" is a derivative abstraction from
"outward reasoning." However, that Aristotle, in contrast to Plato,
can write a Rhetoric treating, in particular, consultative rhetoric
(sumbouleutike rhetorike) as a genuine art, makes plain that he never
intended to reduce all reasoning to demonstration. Aristotle thus
gives us access to the deliberative community of people taking
counsel with each other which is lost in Hobbes and Locke and, in
fact, in the whole tradition of logical analysis after them.
To be sure, Gadamer does not turn to Aristotle to restore the
community of reasoners, but rather to the actual practice of Plato's
dialogues; the practice, namely, of original dialegesthai as "talking
things through" with partners in conversation. 8  What attracts
Gadamer to Aristotle are the distinctions he makes in his account of
the excellences of intellect (aretai t~s dianoias) in Book VI of
Nicomachean Ethics; distinctions, that is, among the various ways of
"knowing the truth" (al~theuein), in particular, episteme (scientific
knowing), techne (knowing how to make something), and phronesis
(the knowing that guides deliberation (bouleuesthai) to good moral
choices). 59
57. ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 76b24-27.
58. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Das Vorbild der Platonischen Dialektik [The Paradigm
of Plato's Dialectic], in GADAMER, supra note 1, at 344-351. We note that the actual practice of
the dialogues continually contradicts the new, monological dialegesthai of "sorting things out" in
collection (sunag6g6) into one form (eidos) and "taking apart" that form into a number of forms
(dihairesis), as the dramatic characters-Socrates, the Stranger from Elea-exposit this within a
dialogue's conversations. In this regard, see both of Plato's The Phaedrus and The Sophist.
59. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 295-307 ("Die Hermeneutische Aktualitat des
Aristoteles [The Applicability of Aristotle to Hermeneutics]").
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At first it would appear that all these ways of relating to the truth
are forms of reasoning that individuals do by themselves, and hence
phron~sis is of special interest insofar as it concerns a special kind of
knowledge of the truth, and not because of any social dimension to it.
It is of interest, this is to say, because the truth it knows and "way
with which" (meth' hodos) it reaches this truth differ from epistemo's
and techne's, and thus an exposition of phronesis can shed new light
on hermeneutics' truth and method. For unlike the truth of science,
the truth of phronesis is temporal, variable, and contingent, or
"susceptible of being otherwise" as Aristotle puts it,6° and the way to
get to it is interrogative, inconclusive reasoning while still underway
within the particular context or "occasion." These things also hold
for technO; however, techne is concerned with bringing a product into
being other than the producer himself or herself, whereas the choices
to which phronesis guides deliberations affect and effect the one who
makes them. Where, then, does the original community of reasoners
enter in?
We may take our cue here from the emphasis in Gadamer's
hermeneutical theory on what he calls Zugehorigkeit, the individual
interpreters' "belonging to" the tradition of the text they are
interpreting. 61 To be sure, when this belonging is mentioned initially,
the point would seem to be a Heideggerian one: it refers to the
impossibility of objective detachment in any reasoning guided by
phronOsis. For in phronisis, in contrast to epist~mO, individuals have
available no perspective above the occasion for their deliberations
which would allow them, as impartial onlookers rather than engaged
participants, to turn the particular case into an object apart from
themselves. Rather, they conduct their individual deliberations
entirely from within the finite horizons of the tradition in which they
always already find themselves under way, and which has affected
and effected them even as their own judgments, decisions, and
choices continue to effect it.62 To take, as Gadamer does, the example
60. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 56, at 1.2.
61. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 297.
62. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 284-90 (discussing Wirkungsgeschichte, or the
interpreter's both effecting, and having been effected by, the history of a tradition). For his
part, Heidegger views the individual's participation in tradition as the failure to "own oneself
authentically," which is to say, as the forfeiture Eigentlichkeit to what "everybody" says, thinks,
and does. Accordingly the task, as he sees it, is not at all to restore the individual to his or her
original community, but for the individual to recover himself or herself from having "fallen" for
the quotidian mediocrity of the public realm (Offentlichkeit). Phronesis thus becomes for him
the individual's Gewissen or conscience. This, of course, is not at all the path Gadamer takes,
and for this reason Gadamer is much more useful than Heidegger in penetrating behind the
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of dikaste phron~sis (jurisprudence), 63 decisions are not made by
individuals from some vantage point outside the tradition of
precedent decisions; interpreters of the law cannot remove
themselves from their situation and context within the tradition in
order to survey it objectively-as if their judgments and decisions
were somehow not effected by it and had no effect on it.
Furthermore, because of their inescapable involvement in the
practice of precedent decisions, interpreters never have available to
them the scientific, epistemic truth given to impartial the6retes or
onlookers, which would allow interpreters to subsume the particular
temporal and local "case" under some transcendent static and eternal
"form" of justice they might have envisioned ahead of time. For the
only "idea" of justice available to them resides in, and evolves
entirely within, the temporal and local history of previous decisions
concerning it. Their reasoning must therefore be by precedent and
analogy, and not by syllogistic demonstration from self-evident first
principles given in thought.64
It is already plain, then, that ZugehOrigkeit, each individual's
belonging to the tradition, makes it impossible for his or her
deliberations to begin with his or her "own" insights as these are first
found en tei psyche (in his or her mind). The starting points for any
genuine deliberation are, rather, what Aristotle, in his account of
both dialectical and rhetorical reasoning, calls endoxa-the received
opinions, beliefs, and judgments from time out of mind that an
individual has already taken over from the community. 6 And these,
obviously, are communicated in ho ex6 logos (in external reasoning
and speech) that the individual has, as in Homer, first heard and
learned from others. In deliberating according to phronesis and
dikast6 phronesis (prudence and jurisprudence), my deliberations,
even if they are my own, are grounded in what we have first reasoned
together. What is proprium was originally communis and any
bouleuesthai was, as we saw in Homer, originally sumbouleuesthai.
abstractions not just of French Cartesian subjectivity but also, as is our concern here, the
English abstraction of private individuals as owners of "property," or what is proprius, their
own, as opposed to communis, the community's. For Gadamer's differences from Heidegger in
this regard, see P. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, The I-Thou Encounter (Begegnung) in Gadamer's
Reception of Heidegger, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER 509-525 (Lewis
Hahn ed., 1997).
63. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 301.
64. "Precedent and analogy" is, of course, language borrowed from Edmund Burke. For a
correlation of Burke with Gadamer, see SMITH, supra note 4, at 210-11, 216-17.
65. See ARISTOTLE, TOPICS 1.1.
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This is made explicit in Gadamer's next reference to Zugehorigkeit,
when, having followed Aristotle in moving from phronesis, first, to
the adjunct intellectual excellence of euboulia or being "well-advised"
in one's taking counsel with oneself (Gadamer: Mitsichzurategehen),6
he follows Aristotle to a discussion of sunesis and sungn6M9.67
Sunesis, from the Greek verb suniemi or "to set together,"
generally means "understanding" in the sense of catching on to
something or "putting two and two together." But clearly, as
Gadamer recognizes, it has an additional, different sense in
Aristotle's Ethics. In elaborating Gadamer's point we might say that,
in the Ethics, sunesis (understanding), both in the judge and in the
one giving counsel, corresponds to dikaste phron~sis and phronesis,
respectively as, in the Rhetoric, eleos corresponds to phobos, as the
pity of the audience, that is, corresponds to the fear of the tragic
protagonist.6 For in feeling pity, someone who has nothing to fear
for himself vicariously feels and experiences fear for someone else
who is about to undergo something fearful. Analogously, in
deliberations guided by sunesis, I am not, as in deliberations guided
by phronisis, confronted with a decision or choice I must make
myself. My task, instead, is to show "understanding for" someone
else who either has now to decide and choose, as is the case in
consultative reasoning, or, as is the case in judicial reasoning, has had
in the past to decide and choose. Only sunesis allows me to judge his
or her action and situation justly. The Heideggerian hermeneutical
idea of understanding as "Verstehen" has modulated here in Gadamer
to understanding as "Verstiindnis." "Plainly," Gadamer tells us, "one
speaks of understanding (Verstandnis) at those times when, in passing
judgment, one puts oneself into the fully concrete instance, into the
situation within which the other person must act. ' 69 And for any fair
and just understanding, he continues, there is a condition that must be
satisfied, namely, that the one showing understanding "wants what is
just too and thus, that he is bound to the other in this communality."70
To this observation Gadamer appends the following crucial point:
The phenomenon of counsel (Rat) in 'matters of conscience'
provides the concrete instance of this [communality]. Just as much
as the one who asks for counsel, so too the one who gives counsel
66. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 304; ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics bk. VI, 9.
67. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 306; ARISTOTLE, supra note 66, bk. VI, 10.
68. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 56, at HI.5.




assumes that the other person is bound together with him in
friendship. Only friends can counsel one another, and only counsel
that is meant in a friendly way makes sense for the one who is
counseled. Thus it is evident here too that the one who has
understanding (Verstandnis) neither thinks of himself, nor judges
the other from some unaffected and dispassionate stance over
against him. Rather, out of a specific allegiance (aus einer
spezifischen Zugehirigkeit) which binds him together with the
other, he is affected and feels along with him, thinks along with
him.7
As we see, in this reading of Aristotle, the sun of sunesis has acquired
overtones of the German mit or "along with."72
In advancing Gadamer against the Anglo-American under-
standing of judicial reasoning, we can say that he is surely right to
lead Aristotle's initial judicial application of sunesis in passing
judgment on someone back to its origin in friends giving and taking
counsel with each other, and this is confirmed by the development of
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics itself.73 For the discussion of sunesis
in Book VI issues directly into a discussion of gn6me, sungn6m, and
epieikeia.74  Gadamer renders these as Einsicht,75 Nachsicht,6 and
Billigkeit,7  or, roughly, as insight, leniency, and fairness. We, in
sounding out slightly different senses of the Greek, shall call these
consideration, forbearance, and clemency. However these are
translated, and no one translation will do, the point is clear: just as
sunesis in Aristotle, and in Gadamer's appropriation of him, does not
refer to an understanding of something that I have by myself but
rather to the understanding we show for each other, so too gn6m6
does not refer here to an insight I have privately into some subject
matter but rather to the insightfulness we share in regard to each
other's situation and to the consideration we show for it. Hence
sunesis issues naturally in gn6me, and gn6me, in turn, in sungn6me as
my ability, again, to think along with others and, what is more, to bear
71. Id.
72. To be sure, we are taking Gadamer's argument here in a direction different from the
one in which it actually moves. His primary point in these passages is that my being bound
together with someone else in a concrete situation which we share makes it impossible for me to
reason according to some sort of learned, technical know-how. Ethical reasoning, in other
words, is no less assimilable to techng, or knowing how to make something, than it is to episteme
or scientific demonstration from fixed first principles. See SMITH, supra note 4.
73. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 66, bk. VI.
74. See id. at 10-11
75. GADAMER, supra note 1, at 306.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 301, 303.
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with them in their own deliberations and choices, either past or
present.
What is more, while epieikeia does mean fairness and equity in
being flexible rather than rigid and exact in a judge's application of
the law to the particular and peculiar case,78 underlying and sustaining
its judicial application is the original sense of epieikein, or what
Gadamer calls Nachlassen. 9 Nachlassen means the readiness to show
clemency, to "ease off" or "let up" from inclement, harsh insistence
upon my own point of view, and to join with others in the community
of those taking and giving counsel about what we are to do.8°
Aristotle can thus neatly conjoin gn6me, sungn6me, and epieikeia in
the following way:
What is called consideration (gnbme), according to which we say
we are good judges (eugndmones), is right judgment of what is fair
(to epieikes). Now a sign of this is that we say that the fair person
(ho epieikes) is the most forbearing (malista sungndmonikos) and
that what is fair (epieikes) is showing forbearance (sungn6me) in
regard to some matters.8'
We see, then, how the excellences of intellect that we bring to
bear in judicial deliberations do indeed have their origin in
consultative reasoning and need continually to be tied back into it.
For I can be a fair judge of others only insofar as I and they know
each other to "belong to" the same community of reasoners, and
insofar, therefore, as I can both give and take counsel with them. To
reason well judicially, I must first have the excellences of intellect that
enable me to reason consultatively and communally. To be a fair
judge, this is to say, I must, to begin with, not be a judge at all.
CONCLUSION
From this exposition of the excellences of intellect that guide our
right reasoning we may conclude, therefore, that bouleuesthai (taking
counsel with oneself) and euboulia (being well advised in one's taking
counsel with oneself) have their origin in sumbouleuesthai (taking
counsel with others). Reasoning, even judicial reasoning, originates
in our belonging together, our Zugehorigkeit, in a community of
reasoners, a fact we have confirmed with Achilles' self-imposed
isolation from the boulai or councils of the Achaeans. This has
78. See id. at 303; ARISTOTLE, supra note 66, bk. VII, 14.
79. See GADAMER, supra note 1, at 301.
80. See id. at 96-97 (discussing the Spielverderber or spoilsport).
81. ARISTOTLE, supra note 66, bk. VI, 11.
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important, challenging consequences for Anglo-American argumen-
tative and judicial theory.
Toulmin, for example, may be said to have advanced our
understanding of reasoning immeasurably by replacing the paradigm
of abstract syllogistic demonstration with the paradigm of concrete
judicial reasoning with its "claims," "grounds," "warrants," and
"backing" in regards to a legal res or causa, as one legal persona
advances these "claims" in contest with another.82 Toulmin, however,
does not see what Gadamer makes plain: that this judicial reasoning is
itself a derivative abstraction from the original community of
reasoners which must be restored as the true basis of any judicial
reasoning if the latter is to be truly fair and just. Dikanikd rhetorike,
judicial rhetoric, this is to say, must be restored to its ground and
origin in sumbouletike rhetoriki, consultative rhetoric. Indeed,
Toulmin only perpetuates the abstractions we have traced,
abstractions beginning with Plato and intensified in Hobbes and
Locke. As in these last two, so too in Toulmin, logos (argument) is
assumed to originate privately and wordlessly in my own mind-en t~i
psychO, as Plato and Aristotle would say-and is then to be
"exchanged," that is, asserted and defended in self-interested
"transactions" with other private individuals.83 When Toulmin points
out that the paradigm of judicial reasoning has become pervasive in
all argument, he seems blithely indifferent to the fact that judicial
reasoning, in its contemporary derivative and uprooted form, has
effectively displaced and buried the original ways we exist and talk
with each other in availing ourselves of the words said from time out
of mind that we have first heard from others. Gadamer's retrieval of
Aristotle provides a necessary corrective to this fateful oversight and,
at the same time, a radical challenge to the assumed bases of the
Anglo-American understanding of reasoning.
82. See TOUMLIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO REASONING, supra note 3.
83. I am using "abstraction" here in a Hegelian/Marxian sense that is admittedly foreign to
anything Gadamer might say. My point is that judicial reasoning, as Toulmin exposits it,
belongs to what Hegel calls the condition of right and that this condition of right has "negated"
the concrete ethical substance (Sittliche Substance) once given by the ethical realm from which it
has "abstracted." Marx superimposes on this Hegelian dialectic his own delineation of the
negation of original human community in the ever-increasing dehumanizing abstractions of
commercial exchange. From a Marxian perspective, Toulmin's judicial reasoning would be just
one more excrescence of an economy based on the exchange of private property.
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